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    <title>Openreception on moltenbit</title>
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      <title>Auditing OpenReception: 16 CVEs in an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform</title>
      <link>https://moltenbit.net/posts/auditing-openreception/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenReception is an open-source appointment booking platform aimed at medical practices, with a self-hosted edition and a commercially hosted multi-tenant version. Its 1.0 release was covered as an open-source alternative to commercial schedulers like Doctolib by &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.heise.de/en/news/OpenReception-1-0-Open-source-appointment-scheduling-for-doctor-s-offices-ready-11278805.html&#34;&gt;heise&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.golem.de/news/openreception-offene-doctolib-alternative-ist-fertig-2605-208278.html&#34;&gt;Golem&lt;/a&gt;. Its selling point is end-to-end encryption: patient data is supposed to stay readable only to the staff it is meant for, while the server holds ciphertext it cannot decrypt. A single instance can host many independent practices, and it ships as a SvelteKit application backed by PostgreSQL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I audited the released code shortly after the 1.0 line shipped and ran a local instance from the official docker-compose to validate findings. Over the audit I reported 16 vulnerabilities. All of them were assigned CVEs, four were rated Critical, and all were fixed before public disclosure on 2026-05-20.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two of the four hand an attacker full administrative control, one lets them log in as anyone, and the last quietly defeats the encryption the whole product is built on.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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